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Bioracism, or, Spiritual Evolutionism 
 
A. Kiarina Kordela  
I.  From Space to Race 
 
On November 10, 2004, eight days after the murder of the film director Theo van Gogh 
in Amsterdam, Etienne Balibar was invited to Radboud University in Nijmegen, the 
oldest city in the Netherlands, to offer that year’s Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in 
Human Geography. The title of his talk, which was subsequently translated and published 
in several European languages, was “Europe as Borderland,” indicating that far from 
“being a solution or a prospect,” “the issue of citizenship and cosmopolitanism” in 
Europe must be based on the fact that “Europe currently exists as a borderland.”1 By this, 
Balibar means that “the question of ‘borders’…is central when we reflect about 
citizenship and, more generally, political association”; and the question of borders itself 
in turn presupposes “address[ing] the issue of political spaces” as a means of 
representing specifically “European borders” (194). 
   Balibar classifies the approaches to this latter question under “four conflicting patterns 
of ‘political spaces’”: “the clash-of-civilizations pattern; the global network pattern; the 
center-periphery pattern; and, finally, the crossover pattern, corresponding to a 
representation of Europe as ‘borderland’” (194). These patterns “seem to be largely 
incompatible,” tending to “be associated with opposite policies concerning nationality 
and citizenship, residence and mobility, activity and security” (194). 
   A comparison between the first and second models makes this apparent. While the 
clash-of-civilizations pattern always maintains, precisely, a clash of civilizations— 
however this may be demarcated (e.g., politico-economically, as in the Cold War and the 
“West and the rising superpower of the East (China)” models, or religiously, as in the 
Christian-Islam divide)—the global network pattern, in all its “antagonistic” conceptions, 
is always predicated on the same “common assumptions, ‘postmodernist’ in the broad 
sense,” which always lead to the same “paradoxical consequence,” namely, “the 
dissolution of the object itself” (195–197). In Balibar’s paraphrase, for the global network 
pattern: 
 
‘Europe,’ in a sense, is a phantom of the past, a name that ‘is history’ 
rather than society, politics, or economics, since the flows of 
capitalization, population, communication, and political action, cross its 
territory, investing in its cities and workplaces, but do not elect it as a 
permanent or specific site. Europe is not only deterritorialized, but also 
delocalized, put ‘out of itself ,’ and in the end deconstructed. It may be 
part of the imaginary, but less and less of the real (197). 
 
   While for the first pattern, there remains always an irreconcilable clash between 
civilizations, for the second pattern, the global flow of capital renders both clashes and 
territorial demarcations as imaginary chimeras of the past, thereby dissipating “Europe” 
as an object. 
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   Let us now turn to the “center-periphery model,” the third pattern which remains 
essential in Balibar’s attempt to formulate the fourth “crossover” pattern of “Europe as 
‘borderland.’” This differs from the first two insofar as it does not ascribe to the 
dissolution of the object (even as it may no longer be “Europe” in the old sense of the 
word) and it sustains the notion of the clash (even as it may not be one of “civilizations” 
at least, again, not in the old sense of the word) (194). This is possible because this 
pattern conceives of the clash as internal to the object. What can then be the object and 
clash—the rift within the object—indicated by the third pattern? 
   In the wake of the pioneering work of Fernand Braudel, and as part of neo-Marxist 
critiques of the notion of “development” in the Third World, Immanuel Wallerstein 
elaborates the idea of a distinction between center and periphery, aiming at providing a 
systemic description of the economic and power relations of the capitalist world-system 
in its successive forms since its first phase of expansion in the sixteenth century.2 
According to this model, Balibar writes that:  
 
[Globalization] is not a ‘late’ product of the transformation of capitalism 
into imperialism, but it was already there since the great discoveries of the 
16th century, which laid the bases for the development of capitalism as a 
mode of production, the transformation of medieval kingdoms into 
modern nation-states…and the emergence of ‘universalistic’ ideologies 
(198). 
 
   One advantage of the center-periphery model lies in its pursuit of the concrete historical 
formations of capitalism—such as its imperialist tendency and its development into what 
today we call global capitalism—back to “the bases for the development of capitalism,” 
that is, to those elements structurally required for the development of the capitalist mode 
of production. One such aspect was the necessary “transformation” of small-scale and 
relatively isolationist “medieval kingdoms” (which were the economic molecules 
constituting even the largest empires) into more expansive and encompassing “modern 
nation-states.” 
   Another major thesis of the center-periphery model is that the distinction in question—
between center and periphery—“is not a simple binary opposition (such as ‘North-South,’ 
or ‘developed-underdeveloped')”; rather, Balibar continues, “it involves more concentric 
divisions” (198).  
   This idea constitutes the bridge to the fourth model of “crossover, ‘overlapping folds,’ 
or nappes superposées,” which reverses the meaning of the old theories of Mitteleuropa 
[Middle Europe] to argue that “in the very ‘heart’ of Europe all languages, religions, 
cultures are coexisting and mixing, with origins and connections all over the world.” 
Therefore, if the “middle of Europe” is at all “a ‘middle,’ then,” as “Edward Said put it in 
one of his last interviews speaking about ‘major’ and ‘minor’ literatures,” it “is not a 
center, but, rather, ‘a series of assembled peripheries.’”3 The thrust of this line of 
argument, as Balibar comments, is that:  
 
There is no ‘center’; there are only ‘peripheries.’ Or, better said, each 
region of Europe is or could be considered a ‘center’ in its own right, 
because it is made of overlapping peripheries, each of them open (through 
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‘invasions,’ ‘conquests,’ ‘refuges,’ ‘colonizations,’ and ‘postcolonial 
migrations,’ etc.) to influences from all other parts of Europe, and from 
the whole world. This creates a potential for ethnic and religious conflicts, 
but also for hybridity and cultural invention (200). 
 
Therefore, according to the crossover model, as Balibar argues, it is: 
 
…impossible to represent Europe's history as a story of pure identities, 
running the danger of becoming progressively alienated. Its history can be 
represented only in terms of constructed identities, dependent on a series 
of successive encounters between ‘civilizations’ (if one wants to keep the 
word), which keep taking place within the European space, enclosing 
populations and cultural patterns from the whole world (200). 
 
Having arrived at this conclusion, however, it is crucial to sustain its difference from both 
the fashionable conceptual sloppiness of misunderstood “postmodernism” and the 
traditionalism of essentialized civilizations. To speak of a coexistence of and encounters 
between elements “from the whole world” taking place “within the European space” is 
not in the least tantamount to either the (perceived) dissolution of the object or the 
perpetuation of a clash between (perceived) unalloyed fixed objects—whereby “object” 
refers to both “space” and “elements” (i.e., quasi-civilizations). Thus, we are returning to 
our initial question: What is the object and what is the split and clash within it? What are 
the two struggling sides of the same coin which is our world (the global and 
multiculturalist capitalist world-system of almost the last five centuries) if it is not a clash 
of civilizations or nation-states or even a class struggle, yet again, in the old sense of the 
word? 
   To respond to this question, I turn first to Balibar’s summary of another of the major 
theses of the center-periphery pattern: 
 
[A] world system of economies and states also means an international 
division of labor: not only a specialization of certain regions and countries 
around certain types of products (industrial, raw material, agriculture, 
etc.), but, above all, a hierarchization of the labor force, with or without 
compensatory migrations, and corresponding ideological representations 
of ‘different humankinds’ (which explains, at least in part, why racism, in 
general, is ‘structural’ in such a world system) (198). 
 
The world system of global capital entails an “international division of labor,” in which 
the “hierarchization of the labor force” is predicated not so much on the “specialization” 
of labor around “types of products,” but on “corresponding ideological representations of 
‘different humankinds.’” Balibar concludes that this division of the world-system into 
“different humankinds” reveals that, next to the aforementioned expansive or imperialist 
structural tendency, racism is yet another “structural” constituent of the world-system of 
capitalism. In raising racism to a structurally necessary component of the modern world- 
system of the capitalist mode of production and nation-states, Balibar partly concurs with  
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a thesis central to biopolitics—the path-breaking reconceptualization of political power 
advanced by his compatriot, Michel Foucault. 
 
II.  From Race to Biorace 
 
In the 1970s, Foucault linked bios—the life and body of human beings—to political 
power to indicate a transformation in the mechanisms of power, beginning in the 
seventeenth century (i.e., with the consolidation of the capitalist mode of production as 
mercantilism and its corollary, imperialism). In this shift, political control over “juridical” 
matters extends to include and focus primarily on the “biological existence of a 
population.” The old sovereignty as “the right of seizure of things, time, bodies, and 
ultimately life itself,” gradually yielded to “the administration of bodies and the 
calculated management of life,” with its various “disciplines of the body” and “the 
regulations of the population” as to its “propagation, births…mortality…health, life 
expectancy and longevity,” all of which are functions pertaining to the biological bodies 
of individuals and populations.4 With this transition—in which the power of the 
sovereign is supplemented by and becomes primarily biopolitical power, so that the 
central object of power becomes the administration and normalization of life under the 
ultimate banner of its protection—the question emerges, in Foucault’s words: 
 
How will the [sovereign] power to kill and the function of murder operate 
in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its 
objective?…It is, I think, at this point that racism intervenes…What in fact 
is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of 
life…the break between what must live and what must die…a relationship 
between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike 
relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: ‘The more 
inferior species die out…the more I—as a species rather than individual—
can live, the stronger I will be…’ This is not, then, a military, warlike, or 
political relationship, but a biological relationship…We are dealing with a 
mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the 
workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and 
the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power…Nazism alone 
took the play between the sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of 
biopower to this paroxysmal point. But this play is in fact inscribed in the 
workings of all…modern States…And so, quite naturally, we find that 
racism—not truly an ethnic racism, but racism of the evolutionist kind, 
biological racism—is fully operational (254–262). 
 
   Both Balibar, in pursuing the logic of the center-periphery analytical model, and 
Foucault, following the logical consequences of biopolitical power, arrive at the 
conclusion that racism is a structural—i.e., indispensable—operation in our world- 
system. Yet, each thinker emphasizes a very different aspect. Foucault emphasizes that 
the racism in question—properly modern or biopolitical racism—is not “ethnic” but of an 
“evolutionist” or “biological” kind (as we know it from Nazism, in its extreme form). 
Balibar instead speaks of a racism neither ethnic nor biological, but one predicated on an 
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international division and hierarchization of labor force and a corresponding division in 
the ideological representations of different humankinds. In other words, according to 
Balibar, the core racist distinction—the “break between what must live and what must 
die”—is not constituted on the basis of (to be sure, ideological) evolutionist-biological 
criteria, but on the ideological representations of different humankinds, which are 
correlative with the (real) new international division and hierarchization of labor forces, 
beyond the old divisions of labor according to kinds of products. 
   Given its international or global character, this division of humankinds and labor forces 
must, therefore, be conceived in terms that revise the old conceptions of both “space” and 
“civilization.” To this end, Balibar expands further the afore-cited description of Europe 
according to the crossover model as follows: 
 
[Europe’s] history can be represented only in terms of constructed 
identities, dependent on a series of successive encounters between 
‘civilizations’ (if one wants to keep the word), which keep taking place 
within the European space, enclosing populations and cultural patterns 
from the whole world. Just as it is necessary to acknowledge that in each 
of its ‘regions’ Europe always remains heterogeneous and differs from 
itself as much as it differs from others (including the ‘new Europes’ 
elsewhere in the world) (200). 
 
This passage indicates that the crucial gesture in grasping the logic of the international 
division of humankinds lies in gaining insight into the “successive encounters between 
‘civilizations’…taking place within the European space,” as a result of which we do not 
have a Europe differing from some non-Europe, but European “regions,” each of which 
always “differs from itself as much as it differs from others.” Equally crucial is the 
observation that the said “encounters between ‘civilizations’” are “enclosing populations 
and cultural patterns from the whole world,” that is, both from without and within 
Europe. It is this latter, the clash of “civilizations” within the object (Europe) that makes 
Europe differ from itself in the first place, and provides the mold for its difference from 
anything without Europe, including the “new Europes” elsewhere in the world. 
   Indeed, when Max Weber undertakes the task of explaining the preconditions for the 
establishment of capitalist economy by means of a methodology that goes beyond 
simplistically understood materialism, his primary innovation consists of reformulating 
the question in terms of “civilizations.” The issue, Weber argues, is how is it possible, not 
for capitalist economy, but for the spirit of capitalism to dominate the world? And his 
answer begins with the realization that the “spirit of capitalism…had to fight its way to 
supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces”—by which he means no fleets, be 
they military or merchant, but the forces of the “state of mind,” what we here loosely call 
“civilizations” (56).5 For the first centuries of capitalism, the “most important opponent 
with which the spirit of capitalism…has had to struggle, was…traditionalism,” that is, 
“that type of attitude” or civilization in which a man wants “simply to live as he is 
accustomed to live and to earn as much as it is necessary for that purpose” (58-60). By 
contrast, the “civilization” of capitalism lives on the “wish to earn more and more money 
...an attitude [that] is by no means a product of nature…but can only be the product of a 
long and arduous process of education” (60, 62). The dominance of capitalism 
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presupposes a “process of education” through which the traditionalist “attitude” that is 
concerned with “continual calculations of how the customary wage may be earned with a 
maximum of comfort and a minimum of exertion” has to be replaced with a “civilization” 
for which “labour must…be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling 
[Beruf]” (61–62).6 In identifying the clash between the two civilizations as a “process of 
education,” and specifically as a religious (Protestant) education, Weber also indicates 
that even as violent outbursts are never excluded, the clash in question is primarily 
cultural, ideological, and hegemonic. 
   As for the spaces or regions of Europe that clashed (and sometimes continue to clash) 
with one another throughout this process, Weber mentions many—from Italy and South 
Europe versus Germany, and North versus South Germany, to various specific regions in 
Germany and other Western-Central European territories. Whatever their concrete 
historical and geopolitical circumstances, they are always subsumable under two 
“civilizations” or humankinds. These correspond to the formation of a division between 
two inter-European (and, given the various waves of immigration throughout this history, 
international) classes of labor force and humankinds that transgress and cut across all 
“types” of labor: the race of the “conscientious” ones with “a developed sense of 
responsibility” and a “professional calling” that lies above and beyond any other 
obligation, as well as personal pleasure and leisure—in short, the race of the spirit of 
capitalism—and the “traditionalist” race (61).7 Whatever encounters, intersections, 
hybridizations, and clashes of other “civilizations” that the European geopolitical space 
may have experienced in the past (and continue to experience in the present), it is 
fundamentally in terms of the encounter between these two primary “civilizations” that it 
forms a “borderland.”8 
   Weber’s ultimate point is the assertion that, although the spirit of capitalism, the 
“rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling,” was “born…from the spirit of 
Christian asceticism,” its “essential elements…are the same” as those constituting “the 
content of the Puritan worldly asceticism, only without the religious basis, which by 
[Benjamin] Franklin’s time had died away” (180).9 Toward the very end of his seminal 
work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–05), Weber dares to 
extend his findings into a vague prophecy worth citing extensively: 
 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when 
asceticism was carried out of the cells into everyday life, and began to 
dominate everyday morality, it did its part in building the tremendous 
cosmos of the modern economic order…In Baxter’s view the care for 
external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light 
cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.’10 But fate decreed that 
the cloak should become an iron cage….In the field of its highest 
development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely 
mundane passions….No one knows who will live in this cage in the 
future, or whether…entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a 
great rebirth of old ideas and ideals….For the last stage of this cultural 
development, it might well be truly said: ‘Specialists without spirit,  
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sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level 
of civilization never before achieved’ (181–182, emphasis mine). 
 
   The entailed culmination of Weber’s thesis is that the ascetic principle evolved into the 
“everyday morality” of capitalist “everyday life,” in other words, the “pursuit of wealth” 
for its own sake. The “spirit of capitalism” can reach its full realization only when this 
“everyday morality” becomes fully “stripped of its religious and ethical meaning” or 
“spirit,” and is instead concerned with purely “mundane passions.” At this point, the new 
obstacle or inimical force that the spirit of capitalism has to struggle against for its 
dominance becomes spirit itself qua religio-ethical meaning. The rift within the object 
“capitalist world-system” is one between the spiritless spirit of the endless accumulation 
of capital and a spirit motivated by any other meaning or purpose, which is thus 
automatically experienced as “religio-ethical.” In the constellation of this at once internal 
and international struggle, religion becomes the site par excellence in which all forces 
opposing the spirit of capitalism are condensed, in the same stroke as humanity is divided 
in two humankinds: the secularists and the religious. 
   The criterion of racial difference operative in the capitalist biopolitical world-system, 
therefore, turns out to be, pace Foucault, not biological evolutionism, but what deserves 
the name of spiritual evolutionism. Accordingly, the state of total subjection to the spirit 
of capitalism and the elimination of any other spirit constitutes the highest form of life, 
the race of those who have “attained a level of civilization never before achieved.” Any 
other form of life represents an inferior “civilization” or race. In the process of defending 
the perseverance of the “superior” race, the “inferiors” must be eliminated, preferably 
through a renewed “process of education”—but also, if necessary, and, as we shall see 
below, as some people argue today, with force. 
   Properly, biopolitical racism, bioracism, therefore reveals that bios, the body, and life 
in question, is spirit. At this point, we must turn to the greatest Dutch (and Marano) 
philosophical figure, Benedict de (Baruch) Spinoza, whose specter retroactively reveals 
itself as subtending and informing the core of the entire thesis advanced here. I am 
referring specifically to Spinoza’s path-breaking persistence against Descartes on the 
“union of Mind and Body,” or a fortiori, that from the metaphysical perspective, the 
“Mind is the Body.”11 Today’s revelation of bioracism as spiritual racism (between 
secularists and religious) seals Spinoza’s foresight.  
 
III.  Dutch Bioracism: The Reappropriation of the Enlightenment 
 
Notorious for its resilience as it is, the world order of capitalism has for centuries avoided 
a direct confrontation with the religious order, even as such a confrontation follows with 
structural necessity from the preceding line of thought. In fact, the more advanced the 
development of the capitalist mode of production in a region of the world has been, the 
greater has been its tolerance toward otherness, religious or otherwise. Already in the 
seventeenth-century Dutch republic (now the Netherlands), Spinoza stated, not without 
an admixture of marvel, gratitude, and pride:   
 
The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruits of this freedom in its own great 
prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. For in this most 
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flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every nation [or race, 
according to other translations] and religion live together in the greatest 
harmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-
citizen, save whether he is rich or poor, and whether he generally acts 
honestly, or the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of no 
importance: for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or loosing a 
cause, and there is no sect so despised that its followers—provided that 
they harm no one, pay everyman his due, and live uprightly—are deprived 
of the protection of the magisterial authority.12 
 
   The motto and (at least ideal) modus operandi of the capitalist world-system has always 
been to neutralize practically its structural opposition with its other (nations, races, 
religions, or sects), not by attacking it but precisely by considering it “of no 
importance”—“provided,” of course, that its members “harm no one, pay everyman his 
due, and live uprightly,” the latter being defined by no other standards than those of the 
spirit of capitalism.13 It is, in fact, only at so-called moments of crisis that the spirit of 
capitalism, rather reluctantly, allows itself to get involved in direct confrontation with its 
other. Evidently, since the 1970s and 1980s, several regions of the global economy, the 
Netherlands eminent among them, have been experiencing a kind of crisis that was 
drastically intensified by the events of September 11, 2001. As a result, they cannot avoid 
experiencing a shift from the discourse of multicultural tolerance to direct 
confrontation—that is, a regression in the exercise of power from biopolitics to the 
exercise of sovereign power. 
   Not unlike biopolitics’ difficulty in justifying its explicit interventions of sovereignty, 
the spirit of capitalism meets its most intractable task at such moments of crisis in its 
attempt to justify its recourse to directly confrontational discourses and practices. In its 
current conjunction, the Netherlands, among other European countries, has discovered its 
most appropriate and amenable means in an old movement: the Enlightenment. Ian 
Buruma succinctly recapitulates this turn: 
   
Until recently not much attention was paid outside the universities to the 
currents and crosscurrents of the Enlightenment and the Counter-
Enlightenment. It was the attack on the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001…that brought the Enlightenment back to the center of political 
debate, especially in Holland, one of the countries where it all began more 
than three hundred years ago. Not just academics but politicians and 
popular columnists saw the Enlightenment as the fortress to be defended 
against Islamist extremism…[which now is] seen…as our contemporary 
Counter-Enlightenment.14 
 
   Both Western intellectual and public voices and Muslim critics of Islam claim the 
philosophical tradition of the Enlightenment as their ally in the fight against what is now 
clearly perceived as the common enemy, religion. In the May 6, 2005, issue of the 
Amsterdam-based Dutch newspaper Trouw, one can read the Dutch “philosopher” and 
publicist Yoram Stein commenting on two sensationalistic best sellers: 
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Does a civilized society need religion? Historian Jonathan Israel wrote 
Radical Enlightenment about the philosophical current which has no room 
for God. He says: “Hirsi Ali is an heir to Spinoza.”15 
 
   Similarly, the worldview of the Iranian scholar and columnist of a harsh critique of 
political Islam, Afshin Ellian, is summarized in Buruma’s recapitulation as follows: 
 
Citizenship of a democratic state means living by the laws of the country. 
A liberal democracy cannot survive when part of the population believes 
that divine laws trump those made by man. The fruits of the European 
Enlightenment must be defended, with force if necessary. It is time for 
Muslims to be enlightened too….The Dutch government must act to 
protect those who criticize Islam. No religion or minority should be 
immune to censure or ridicule. The solution to the Muslim problem is a 
Muslim Voltaire, a Muslim Nietzsche—that is to say, people like ‘us, the 
heretics—me, Salman Rashdie, Ayaan Hirsi Ali’ (25). 
 
   All this rhetoric is unsurprisingly accompanied by an anti-European and Philo-
American spirit that condemns the former’s welfare social system while propagating and 
justifying the latter’s practices of unbridled capitalism and militarism: 
  
European intellectuals, in their self-hating nihilism and utopian anti-
Americanism, have lost the stomach to fight for Enlightenment values. 
The multicultural dream is over. The West, except for the U.S., is too 
afraid to use its power. The European welfare state is a disastrous, 
patronizing system that treats people like patients (25). 
 
   For anyone who has the slightest idea of what ideas the tradition of the Enlightenment 
has represented (beyond its pop versions), it is conspicuously evident that such 
invocations are utterly preposterous and misleading—which, alas, is not to say any less 
effective. Buruma himself takes at face value as one “of the main claims of 
Enlightenment’s philosophy…that its ideas based on reason are by definition universal” 
(29). If one has read Hegel’s Philosophy of History—with its determined march from the 
“Oriental” to the “German World,” and the concomitant trajectory from the pagan and 
Judaic religions to Christianity and further to the Reformation and the Enlightenment (not 
to mention Nietzsche)—one would know what Buruma mistakes for a critique of the 
Enlightenment, namely, that “its values are not just universal, but more importantly, 
‘ours,’ that is, European, Western values” (29). Or to put it in the properly understood 
universal idiom of the Enlightenment, Nietzsche expounds: 
  
Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals…if it is 
a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the 
individuals within it refrain from doing from each other: it will have to be 
an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become 
predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living 
141 
 
and because life simply is will to power. But there is no point on which the 
ordinary consciousness of Europeans resists instruction as on this: 
everywhere people are now raving, even under scientific disguises, about 
coming conditions of society in which the “exploitative aspect” of society 
will be removed—which sounds to me as if they promised to invent a way 
of life that would dispense with all organic functions. “Exploitation” does 
not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the 
essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of 
the will to power, which is after all the will of life.16 
    
   To give credit where it is due, Afshin Ellian’s argument is indeed very close to this 
Hegelian/Nietzschean Enlightenment, under the precondition that one admits two points. 
The first, as Buruma rightly puts it, is that: 
  
The war between Ellian’s Enlightenment and…[the representatives of the 
Islam] is not a straightforward clash between [a particular] culture and 
universalism, but between two different visions of the universal, one 
radically secular, the other radically religious (32). 
   
It is, therefore, a matter of the will of each vision of the universal to “strive to grow, 
spread, seize, become predominant” over the other. Of course, the question remains open 
as to whether the best means of fighting in this struggle is militarism or cultural 
hegemony. In either case, it must also be added that, as follows from the previous line of 
argument, the spirit of capitalism today sides with the “radically secular” vision of the 
universal. This is why, to quote Buruma again: 
  
[T]here is a difference between the anticlericalism of Voltaire, who was up 
against one of the two most powerful institutions of eighteenth-century 
France, and radical secularists today battling a minority within an already 
embattled minority (33).17 
 
   This incommensurable difference in the needs and demands of the spirit of capitalism 
between the two centuries brings about yet another profound distortion in the reception 
and interpretation of Enlightenment philosophy. Apparently, one wants today to invoke 
Voltaire without also recalling that, far from being a secularist, he was not even an atheist 
but a deist, who notoriously also said that, “Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer [If 
God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him].”18 Also, in their multiple 
invocations of Spinoza, the secularist militants evidently forget that, far from arguing that 
a “civilized society” has “no room for God,” Spinoza argued that the whole world is one 
substance which is “God, or Nature [deu sive natura].”19 
   The specific historical struggle of the Enlightenment against the oppressive institution 
of the Christian church today is resuscitated as the struggle against God and religion tout 
court—in the name and support of today’s most dominant source of oppression, the spirit 
of capitalism. And given that “God” and “religion” are now perceived in the Western 
imaginary as exotic products imported from “elsewhere,” once again our (all of us) 
internal clash is perceived as one between “us” and “them.” 
142 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Balibar 2009, p. 190. 
 
2.  Drawing on dependency theory for the concepts of “core” and “periphery,” Immanuel 
Wallerstein developed his theory primarily in the three volumes of The Modern World-
System, which appeared in 1974, 1980, and 1989.  
3.  Balibar 2009, p. 200; referring to Katz and Smith 2003. 
 
4.  Foucault 1990, pp. 136–140. 
5.  It does not hurt to stress that Max Weber’s use of the term “spirit” throughout his 
work is to be distinguished from the Hegelian notion of the “Spirit of History” (though it 
is a much more complicated issue, left unexamined here, whether the various 
Hegelianisms do justice to Hegel’s concept of the “Spirit of History”). Far from implying 
any teleological necessity in the emergence and domination of capitalism, Weber stresses 
the precarious and contingent character of the processes that gradually allowed for its 
establishment. Moreover, Weber introduces the concept of the spirit of capitalism as a 
propaedeutic and undefined operative device, to be gradually defined through the process 
of his investigation, thereby eventually reversing any hitherto assumptions as to the 
character of the spirit in question (notably through his thesis that, instead of some 
worldly, cynical, and profit-oriented state of mind, capitalism is motivated by an 
“unworldly” spirit that strives for salvation and is guided by ascetic principles).      
6.  Of course, the etymological linchpin of Weber’s entire thesis lies in this German 
word, Beruf, meaning both “profession” and “calling.” 
7. Forming the fundamental division organizing the world-system of capitalism, the 
distinction and clash between the spirit of capitalism and traditionalism underlies, and 
provides the explanatory scheme for, other recent events in contemporary Europe, such as 
the financial crisis in the Eurozone due to the economic deficit of Greece (as well as 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) and the need for bailout packages. As the Philomila 
Tsoukala, op-ed contributor to The New York Times, writes in (what to my knowledge is) 
the sole profound analysis of the situation, that measures such as “rising taxes,” “budget 
cuts,” other “cuts in public spending and civil service wages and pensions,” and the 
overall “weakening [of] rules protecting workers,” “overlook the basic organizing 
principle of Greek society—the family—and its stultifying influence on the economy.” 
Tsoukala continues: 
 
Welfare programs like unemployment benefits and housing subsidies are 
already significantly smaller in Greece than in the rest of Europe; Greeks 
rely instead on government jobs and their families for support…Upward 
of 75 percent of Greek businesses are family-owned. Most are small and 
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rely on family labor, which is as flexible as it gets—in practice, no 
minimum-wage or maximum-hour laws apply. Women often work for 
their husbands without salary, and divorce laws don’t effectively ensure 
the divorcing spouse’s stake in the family business or remuneration for the 
work she put into it—meaning it’s very difficult to leave a marriage. 
Young people are similarly constrained. The lucky ones land government 
jobs through family connections or work in a family business, ‘helping 
out’ with no pay while formally unemployed. The unlucky ones toil for 
meager wages at someone else’s family business, where they have almost 
no chance of advancing into management. Many live with their parents up 
to the age of 35 because they can’t afford to live on their own…Young 
people also depend on their families to supplement their wages and pay 
the ‘tips’ necessary to get decent health care…Until Greece can find a way 
to disentangle the private sector from the family and find another way to 
allocate resources—free from the intergenerational, class and gender 
inequities of the family unit—no amount of reform will make a 
difference” (Tsoukala 2010). 
 
In short, only a restructuring of Greek society that eliminates its traditionalist 
organization (around the family) can result in an economy capable of surviving within the 
world-system of late capitalism.   
  
8.  Due to different historical developments that cannot be pursued here in detail, within 
the Global North it is Europe that today embodies at its most advanced and in its most 
conspicuous form, the “borderland.” Comparing Europe to the other long-standing great 
power of the Global North, the U.S.A., cardinal among the reasons for Europe’s 
contemporary unique state of affairs is considered to be what some scholars refer to as 
the “friendly” and the “hostile” separations between the church and the state, pertaining 
to the U.S.A. and Europe, respectively—a distinction largely due to the specificities of 
the European Enlightenment (see Maier 2004, p. 109). Indicative of the profound 
difference between the models found in France and the mid-twentieth century United 
States are the comments of the French philosopher and one of the drafters of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Jacques Maritain. He considered the U.S. model 
of that time to be more amicable because it had both “sharp distinction and actual 
cooperation” between church and state, what he called “an historical treasure,” and he 
admonished the United States: “Please to God that you keep it carefully, and do not let 
your concept of separation veer round to the European one” (cited in Carson 2008, p. 
189). Another more recent major factor accounting for the differences between the 
contemporary U.S. and Europe may, of course, be the formation and subsequent collapse 
of the “Communist Bloc” within European territory, with all its consequences on both the 
development of the European Left and inter-European migrational movements since the 
1990s. 
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9.  Benjamin Franklin’s two texts—Necessary Hints to Those That Would Be Rich (1736) 
and Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748)—being Weber’s starting point of comparison 
between the “spirit of capitalism” (to be defined through the process of the comparison 
itself) and the credos and life-philosophies of various Protestant denominations.  
10. Weber is referencing The Saints’ Everlasting Rest (1650), the most important work of 
the English Puritan church leader and theologian, Richard Baxter (1615–1691). 
11. Spinoza 1985, pp. 457–58; Ethics, part II, proposition 13 and scholium. 
12. Spinoza 1951, p. 264; TPT, chapter XX, par. 14; punctuation modified. 
 
13. Even scholars who intend to foreground the discriminatory practices of the advanced 
capitalist regions of the seventeenth century against their Other, admit as much. Read, for 
instance, Debra Nails’s commentary on Spinoza’s afore-cited passage:  
 
The description may have been more or less accurate when Spinoza 
published it in 1670, but had not long been so; and Amsterdam, while 
more progressive than other cities of the republic, found its policies of 
tolerance under constant attack from the Calvinist consistory of the 
Reformed Church. Thus the Jewish community there, primarily Marrano 
Jews whose ascendants had fled the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, but 
many of whose religious practices had been affected by forced 
conversions and proximity to Roman Catholicism, were always on their 
guard, self-policing their community to prevent any appearance of 
sacrilege or scandal that might draw the unwelcome attention of 
authorities. Jews were not subject in the Dutch republic to such ‘blood 
purity’ laws as had prevented even converses—Jews who had converted 
willingly or not to Christianity—from attaining offices of authority in their 
home countries, but some of the guilds were still closed to Jews, and 
isolated acts of discrimination were not unknown. However, Jewish 
expertise in trade and connections with the Spanish and Portuguese 
colonies in the New World ensured for the Jews of Amsterdam, including 
Spinoza's merchant family, a share in the great Dutch prosperity of the 
seventeenth century” (Nails 2005, p. 58).  
 
Scholars, whatever the intent and purpose of their search, admit, as Nails puts it, the 
“monetary and eschatological reasons behind such tolerance as the Jews enjoyed” (see 
also Simon Shama, particularly chapter 8, “Inside, Outside”). 
 
14. Baruma 2006, pp. 28–29. 
15. Trouw (6 May 2005), cited in Buruma 2006, p. 24. 
 
16. Nietsche 1989, p. 203, section 259. 
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17. This reconfiguration of the role of (pop-)Enlightenment ideals revamped as secularist 
ideals, as the main contemporary ideology of the spirit of capitalism, also explains the at-
first-sight surprising switch of credos and political lines between Left- and Right-wing 
parties in the Netherlands during the last decades. The traditional positions of the Right 
(e.g., belief in (our) culture and tradition) and the Left (e.g., universalism, scientific 
socialism) are gradually yielding to the Leftist commitment to “culture and tradition, 
especially ‘their’ cultures and traditions, that is, those of the immigrants,” while now the 
Right argues “for the [so-called] universal values of the Enlightenment” (Buruma 2006, 
p. 30; see also Russell Shorto). A similar logic is evidenced in the current appropriation 
of debates around issues of sexuality and their exploitation in the struggle against or for 
Muslim immigrants (see, for instance, Gert Hekma).      
18. Voltaire’s aphorism is contained in his 1768 verse epistle to the anonymous author of 
the controversial work, The Three Impostors. Crucially, far from being the cynical 
remark it is often taken for—i.e., as intending to represent God as a sheer product of 
human fiction—it was meant as a retort to the atheistic clique of d'Holbach, Grimm, and 
others. When, in 1761, d’Holbach’s Christianisme dévoilé [Christianity Unveiled] 
appeared, in which he attacked Christianity and religion in general as an impediment to 
the moral advancement of humanity, Voltaire made known his aversion to d'Holbach's 
philosophy, writing that it “is entirely opposed to my principles. This book leads to an 
atheistic philosophy that I detest” (Voltaire, Oeuvres, pp. xxxvii, p. 23). 
19. Spinoza 1985, p. 544; Ethics, part. 5 preface.  
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